In combinatorial auctions that use VCG, a seller can sometimes increase revenue by dropping bidders (see e.g. [5] ). In our previous work [26] , we showed that such failures of "revenue monotonicity" occur under an extremely broad range of deterministic strategyproof combinatorial auction mechanisms, even when bidders have "known single-minded" valuations. In this work we consider the question of whether revenue monotonic, strategyproof mechanisms for such bidders can be found in the broader class of randomized mechanisms. We demonstrate that-surprisingly-such mechanisms do exist, show how they can be constructed, and consider algorithmic techniques for implementing them in polynomial time.
Introduction
In combinatorial auctions, multiple goods are sold simultaneously and bidders are allowed to place bids on bundles, rather than just on individual goods. These auctions have been widely studied in the last decade, with the ultimate goal of better allocating scarce resources among bidders who value them non-additively (see e.g. [9] ). When designing a combinatorial auction mechanism, one may desire that it satisfy various different properties. One important property is that it be a dominant strategy for selfish bidders to truthfully reveal their private information to the mechanism. * Dept. of CS, University of British Columbia. baharak@cs.ubc.ca.
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Quite a lot of work in the literature is concerned with the design of strategyproof mechanisms for combinatorial auctions [2, 3, 6, 7, 17, 19, 25, 31, 32] . Another important class of properties concerns an auction's revenue. An auction mechanism is called optimal if it maximizes the expected revenue. Optimal auctions were originally studied in the context of single-good auctions [16, 23, 28] . More recent work has extended these ideas to design multi-unit or multi-good auctions that offer strong revenue guarantees, usually achieving a constant fraction of the optimal revenue [1, 8, 14, 20, 29] . We are concerned with describing the way an auction's revenue changes with the number of participating bidders. Intuitively, one might expect that revenue weakly increases as the number of bidders grows, as competition also increases. We say that an auction mechanism is revenue monotonic when this intuition is correct: the seller's revenue is guaranteed to weakly increase as bidders are added.Groves mechanisms in general and VCG in particular have gained substantial attention because they are the only strategyproof mechanisms that guarantee efficient allocations [15] . However, VCG has also received numerous criticisms ( [5, 30] ). One of these problems is that VCG is not revenue monotonic for bidders (unless bidders' valuations are restricted; [4] ). Following an example due to [5] , consider an auction with three bidders and two goods for sale. Suppose that bidder 2 wants both goods for the price of $2 billion whereas bidder 1 and bidder 3 are willing to pay $2 billion for the first and the second good respectively. The VCG mechanism awards the goods to bidders 1 and 3 for the price of zero, yielding the seller zero revenue. However, in the absence of either bidder 1 or bidder 3, the revenue of the auction would be $2 billion. In our previous work [26, 27] we showed that this problem is not restricted to VCG. Instead, we proved that no revenue monotonic mechanism exists in a very broad class of deterministic, strategyproof combinatorial auction mechanisms. We define this setting and class of mechanisms in Section 2, and also state our impossibility result. Here, we note two lines of research that are closely related to our own past work. First, Day and Milgrom [10, 21] used coalitional game theory to investigate revenue monotonicity in the context of efficient mechanisms. Second, Yokoo et al. [31, 32] investigated false-name bidding; however, their proof can also be understood as showing that revenue monotonicity fails in ef-ficient strategyproof mechanisms. In contrast, we do not restrict ourselves to efficient mechanisms.
There are many cases ( [11, 12, 13, 18] ) in which randomized mechanisms are able to achieve desirable properties that cannot be obtained by deterministic mechanisms. In Section 3 we define randomized mechanisms and some desirable properties for our setting. In Section 4 we show that it is possible to circumvent our impossibility result, at least for known single-minded bidders, by proposing a class of combinatorial auction mechanisms that we call "stepwise" randomized combinatorial auction mechanisms. We also show how to construct such revenue-monotonic mechanisms, though this construction can sometimes require exponential time. Finally, in Section 5 we give a polynomial-time algorithm for constructing our mechanism.
Deterministic Mechanisms
To prove results about revenue monotonicity, we need to reason about the behaviour of combinatorial auction mechanisms when bidders are added or dropped. We also need to reason about mechanisms whose behavior can depend on bidder preferences-for example, each bidder may have a "single-minded" interest in one particular bundle. For these reasons, we provide a set of general definitions in which the allocation of goods and the payments imposed may depend on which bidders participate and which goods are for sale, as well as on bidders' declared preferences.
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the universal set of n biddersall the potential bidders who exist in the world. Let N ⊆ N denote the set of bidders participating in a particular auction. Let G be the finite universe of goods for sale. Let G ⊆ G denote the set of goods for sale in a particular auction. Let both N and G be common knowledge among all bidders and the auctioneer.
A valuation function describes the values that a bidder holds for subsets of the set of goods in G. Let valuation function v G,i for bidder i ∈ N map 2 G to the nonnegative reals. For every G ⊂ G let valuation function v G,i be the projection of v G,i into G. Whenever G is understood, we drop it from the subscript. We assume that bidders have quasilinear utility functions; that is, bidder i's utility for bundle a i is v i (a i ) − p i , where v i is her valuation and p i is any payment she is required to make.
A valuation profile is an n-tuple v = (v 1 , . . . , v n ), where, for every participating bidder i, v i is a valuation function. Let V denote the universal set of all possible valuation profiles. Observe that valuation profiles always have one entry for every potential bidder, regardless of the number of bidders who participate in the auction. We use the symbol ∅ in such tuples as a placeholder for each nonparticipating bidder (i.e., each bidder i ∈ N ). When v is an n-dimensional tuple, then (v 1 , . . .
V N,G denote the set of all valuation profiles given a set of participating bidders N and a set of goods for sale G; that is, the set of all valuation profiles v G for which v i = ∅ if and only if i ∈ N .
If asked to reveal her valuation, a bidder may not tell the truth. Denote the declared valuation function of a (participating) bidder i asv i . Letv be the declared valuation profile. Use the same notation to describe declared valuation profiles as valuation profiles (e.g., all declared valuation profiles are n-tuples), and furthermore write
In a particular auction, bidders' valuation functions may be drawn from some restricted set. For example, we will need to make such an assumption to model known singleminded bidders. Let V N,G ⊆ V N,G denote a subspace of the universal set of valuation profiles for the set of participating bidders N and the set of goods for sale G. (For example, all valuations consistent with each bidder having a singleminded interest in one known bundle.) Let V N,G denote the universal set of valuation profile subspaces, that is • a, the allocation scheme, maps eachv ∈ V N,G to an allocation tuple a = (a 1 (v), . . . , a n (v)) of goods, where
• p, the payment scheme, maps eachv ∈ V N,G to a payment tuple p = (p 1 (v), . . . , p n (v)), where p i (v) is the payment from bidder i to the auctioneer such that
We refer to a i and p i as bidder i's allocation and payment functions respectively. Wheneverv can be understood from the context, we refer to a i (v) and p i (v) by a i and p i , respectively. Ifv i (a i ) > 0, we say that bidder i "wins". We denote by A G the set of all possible partitions of G into n partitions; i.e. the set of all possible ways of distributing goods among participating bidders. For any given allocation a ∈ A G , we denote by a i the set of goods that are allocated to bidder i under a.
Mechanisms that give rise to dominant strategies are especially desirable, as bidders are spared having to reason about each others' behavior. A direct CA mechanism is said to be truthful if in equilibrium bidders declare their true valuations to the mechanism. A direct CA mechanism is said to be strategyproof (or dominant strategy truthful) if every bidder has the dominant strategy of revealing her true preferences.
The revenue of an auction is the sum of payments made to the auctioneer. Informally, an auction mechanism is revenue monotonic if the auctioneer could never increase revenue by dropping a bidder. 
It is natural, and commonly assumed, that a bidder should make no payment to the mechanism unless she wins. We call this assumption participation. A mechanism is weakly maximal with respect to a bidder i if, whenever i values any good g sufficiently, the mechanism does not withhold that good or give it away to a bidder who does not value it. (For formal definitions see [27] .)
Our main results refer to a restricted class of valuation spaces: known single-minded bidders. Our definition of this class follows Mu'alem and Nisan [22] and Nisan [24] . 
N,G is simply the space of valuation profiles in which participating bidders are all single-minded, with the bundle valued by participating bidder i being b i .
Let V (ksm) denote the set of valuation profile subspaces for known single-minded bidders; that is V
We say that a mechanism is defined for known single-minded bidders if its set of valuation profile subspaces is V (ksm) . From the definition of mechanism (Definition 2.1), it follows that the allocation and payment functions depend on the set V Roughly speaking, a mechanism defined for known single-minded bidders satisfies consumer sovereignty if by bidding high enough, any bidder can win the bundle she values-more formally, given any bidder i and the declared values of the other bidders,v −i , there exists some finite amount
In our past work [26, 27] , we proved an impossibility result: there is no deterministic combinatorial auction mechanism that satisfies our desirable properties. To obtain as strong a result as possible, we proved that the result is true even when the bidders are known single-minded.
defined for known single-minded bidders that offers dominant strategies to bidders and satisfies participation, consumer sovereignty, and weak maximality with respect to at least two bidders. Then M is not revenue monotonic.

Randomized Mechanisms
In this work, we study the consequences of relaxing the assumption that mechanisms are deterministic. More specifically, we ask whether there are revenue monotonic randomized mechanisms that satisfy our desired properties. (As we will see, moving to the randomized case will also require reinterpretations of these properties, particularly of consumer sovereignty.) As the following definition states, a randomized CA mechanism produces a distribution over allocations and payments. Given V N,G ∈ V, let π a (v ) denote the probability that allocation a ∈ A G will be chosen given declared valuesv . Let p i (v ) denote the expected payment of i.
A randomized CA mechanism is strategyproof in expectation if and only if truth-telling is a dominant strategy for all bidders in the game induced by expectation.
Randomized mechanisms can be defined for known single-minded bidders in a manner analogous to that used for deterministic mechanisms above. In what follows, we concern ourselves only with randomized mechanisms for known single-minded bidders.
For a randomized CA mechanism that is defined for known single-minded bidders, let w i (v ) denote the probability that bidder i wins-that is, i is allocated a bundle that
The following theorem characterizes the class of strategyproof randomized mechanisms defined over known singleminded bidders (indeed, for any single parameter domain). and every bidder i ∈ N and every fixedv −i we have that Now we generalize the properties we defined for deterministic mechanisms to the randomized setting.
DEFINITION 3.2. (REVENUE MONOTONIC. FOR RCAM'S)
A truthful randomized CA mechanism is revenue monotonic if dropping a bidder never increases the mechanism's expected revenue.
Next we define maximality for randomized CA mechanisms. Our definition here is stronger (more general) than the weak maximality definition we provided for deterministic mechanisms. We chose to use weak maximality in [26, 27] because it strengthened our impossibility result stated there. For randomized mechanisms, we will prove a positive result, namely the existence of revenue monotonic randomized mechanisms with several desired properties. To make our positive result as strong as possible, we use a more general notion of maximality here. Informally, a mechanism is maximal with respect to a bidder i if, whenever i values any subset of goods s (rather than a single good g) sufficiently, the mechanism does not withhold that bundle or give the goods in the bundle away to bidders who do not value them.
DEFINITION 3.4. (MAXIMALITY FOR RCAM'S)
A truthful randomized CA mechanism M is maximal with respect to bidder i iff ∀N ⊆ N and ∀G ⊆ G there exists a set of nonnegative finite constants {α N,G,i,s s ⊆ G} such that the following holds. For all i ∈ N , V N,G ∈ V, and v ∈ V N,G , for any allocation a that has a positive support under M -that is, a is chosen by M with probability above zero-either:
An allocation a is maximal if it satisfies either (1) or (2) for all bidders i. A randomized CA mechanism M satisfies maximality if any allocation with positive support under M is maximal.
It is somewhat harder to decide how to extend our consumer sovereignty definition to randomized mechanisms for known single-minded bidders. We first consider two possible extensions to the definition for deterministic mechanisms, which can be seen as opposite extremes. First, we could define consumer sovereignty (I) as requiring that, fixing bids of the others, any bidder is able to win any desired bundle with probability one if she bids high enough. Unfortunately, in this case we recover our previous impossibility result. On the other hand, we could define consumer sovereignty (II) as requiring that any bidder be able to win any desired bundle with some probability above zero if she bids high enough. This leads to a different problem. Consider a mechanism M with α N,G,i,s = 0 that chooses a maximal allocation uniformly at random, and charges nothing. Note that each bidder wins her desired bundle in at least one maximal allocation. Therefore, it is easy to verify that M is strategyproof and satisfies participation, consumer sovereignty, and maximality with respect to all bidders. It also is revenue monotonic since it never collects any money.
The above arguments suggest that we ought to seek an intermediate definition for consumer sovereignty. We thus present the following definition, which roughly requires that, given the valuations of the other bidders, a bidder who starts bidding at 0 and then raises her bid can increase her probability of winning by at least δ at least γ times. 
It is easy to see that if a mechanism satisfies (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty for some γ = k, it then also satisfies (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty for any γ for which 0 ≤ γ ≤ k. Observe that the constants c i,si are independent of all bidders' declared valuations; in a sense, they can be seen as "bidder-specific, leveled reserve prices." Thus, while we do not assume that the mechanism designer knows anything about the valuation distribution(s), if such information is available, it can be useful for setting these constants.
We now propose a simple and useful class of randomized mechanisms. These define the probability that any given bidder wins as a stepwise function of her bid amount, with a finite number of steps. 
We call the mechanism a γ-step randomized mechanism if it satisfies the above for k = γ.
A γ-step randomized mechanism can be interpreted as a mechanism that for each bidder i, cares only about specific declared values, c i,0 , c i,1 , . . . , c i,γ and treats any declared value of i between c i,si and c i,si+1 the same as c i,si . In fact, one can easily verify that w i (v ) = w i (c 1,s1 , . . . , c n,sn ), for allv where c i,si ≤v i < c i,si+1 for all participating bidders i. If a γ-step randomized mechanism additionally has the following monotonicity property that either (1) w i (c i,si ,v −i ) + δ ≤ w i (c i,si+1 ,v −i ), or (2) w i (c i,si+1 ,v −i ) = 1, then the mechanism satisfies (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty. Figure 1 shows a sample w i for a 6-step stepwise randomized mechanism, given fixed bids by the other bidders. Observe that, by Theorem 3.1, if the mechanism is to satisfy strategyproofness and participation, our choice of w i must imply a specific choice of p i . Here, if the bidder declareŝ v i , she must pay an amount equal to the area of the shaded region. 
A Revenue Monotonic Mechanism
In this section, we construct a γ-step randomized mechanism, which we dub M γ , that is strategyproof and revenue monotonic and satisfies participation, maximality and (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty, for any given γ and for some δ > 0.
We construct M γ such that when a bidder i increases her bid one step, her probability of winning increases by δ unless she wins in all maximal allocations, in which case her probability of winning is equal to 1. We first give a nonlinear feasibility program F and show that its solutions correspond to mechanisms that satisfy all our desired properties. We then construct a quadratically constrained linear program (QLCP) P , and prove that all of its solutions that satisfy one additional constraint also solve F . Finally, we constructively prove that such solutions of P always exist. Given V
(b)
N,G , for all N ⊆ N let M N be the set of all maximal allocations with respect to maximality parameters set to zero-that is, α N,G,i,s = 0, ∀i ∈ N, s ⊆ G. Let M N be a set of maximal allocations-that is M N ⊆ M N -such that each bidder is either allocated her desired bundle or nothing and such that each bidder wins in at least one allocation a ∈ M N . Let0 denote the tuple of declared valuations in which all participating bidders bid 0. 
Feasibility program
Observe that a mechanism is a mapping from declared valuations to allocation probabilities π a 's and payments p i 's. Here we express such a mapping as a solution to a set of feasibility programs (albeit ones with N,G . Observe that because this last set is (uncountably) infinite, the feasibility program involves an infinite number of both variables and constraints. some nonlinear constraints, and an uncountably infinite number of both variables and constraints). Recall that any CA mechanism defined for known single-minded bidders is able to condition its behavior on G, N , and V N,G and G ⊆ G, corresponds to a γ-step randomized mechanism that satisfies strategyproofness, participation, maximality, (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty, and revenue monotonicity.
Proof. We must ensure that a solution to the F (V   (b) N,G , G)'s induces a valid mechanism. First, it is necessary to ensure that π N,a 's correspond to probabilities. This is achieved by Constraints (F.a 1 ) and (F.a 2 ). Second, Constraint (F.w) ensures that these allocation probabilities fully define winning probabilities, as required by Equation (3.1). Third, Constraint (F.step) ensures that our mechanism is stepwise randomized. Now we must show that the mechanism satisfies our five desired properties. First, Constraints (F.mon) and (F.sp) together entail both strategyproofness and participation (by Theorem 3.1). Second, Constraint (F.max) entails maximality. Third, Constraint (F.rm) entails revenue monotonicity. Finally, Constraints (F.mon), (F.cs) and (F.δ) together ensure that the mechanism satisfies (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty for a given γ and some δ > 0. ◻ Figure 3 . We will prove that if P (V N,G , and thus has an infinite number of variables and constraints. The main idea in this section is that we can move from an infinite-sized F to a finite-sized QCLP P by working with a finite sized valuation space, ◻ V 
Quadratically constrained linear program Consider quadratically constrained linear program (QLCP)
To show that any solution of P corresponds to a solution of F we provide a mapping from ◻ V N,G , G) for a simple example and show how we can find a solution to it that sets δ > 0. Consider the bidder-bundle setting described in the introduction, which we used to demonstrate that VCG is not revenue monotonic. That is, let G = {g 1 , g 2 } and N = {1, 2, 3}; bidders 1, 2 and 3 are known singleminded, where the bundles valued by bidders 1, 2, and 3 maximize δ subject to: 
Let S 3,2 denote this three-bidder, two-good setting. We state the constraints and explain the solution for the case when all bidders are present and all goods are for sale. That is, let G = G and N = N. One can easily follow the same approach for other choices of G and N , many of which are trivial.
It is easy to verify that there is exactly one choice for M N : we have to either award bidder 2 her desired bundle, or award bidders 1 and 3 each their desired bundle.
As each bidder i belongs to exactly one allocation a ∈ M N , Constraints (P.q 1 )-(P.q 5 ) can be expressed as q N,a,i = 0, for all a ≠ a 2 , a 1,3 and all i ∈ N , and q N,a1,3,1 = q N,a1,3,3 = 1, q N,a2,2 = 1, q N,a1,3,2 = −1, and q N,a2,1 = q N,a2,3 = −1.
Intuitively, q N,a,i ⋅ δ denotes the change to π N,a when bidder i increases her bid by one step. We constrain the q N,a,i 's in (P.π 4 ) such that when i increases her bid by one step-from c i,si to c i,si+1 , the probability that a ∈ M N will be chosen weakly increases if i belongs to a i , and weakly decreases otherwise.
One can illustrate constraints in (P.π 4 ) by the following graph representation. Let GR N be a graph of (γ + 1) N,G . Let there be a directed edge between each pair of nodes that differ in only one of the bidders' declarations, and in which this difference is an increase of exactly one step (i.e., from c i,si to c i,si+1 ). In other words, we can move from one node to another by increasing one bidder's bid by one step. If an edge indicates an increase in bidder i's declared value, we say the edge is of type e i . Now, assign M N labels to each edge, one for each allocation in M N . Allocation a's label on an edge of type e i denotes the change to π N,a by moving along an edge of type e i (which increases bidder i's bid amount by one step) and is equal to q N,a,i ⋅ δ. Define the cost of a path as the absolute value of the sum of the labels of the edges in the path. Proof. For all i ∈ N , the number of edges of type e i is the same in all paths between s and t. Since all edges of type e i have the same label corresponding to allocation a, the sum of a's associated labels along any path between s and t is equal to π N,a (t) − π N,a (s). ◻ Figure 4 represents GR N for S 3,2 . On each edge, the label corresponding to a 1,3 -which denotes the change in π N,a1,3 due to moving along the edge-is equal to q N,a1,3,i ⋅δ for some i ∈ N and is exactly the negative of the label corresponding to a 2 . The the cost of the longest path (e.g., between (c 1,0 , c 2,γ , c 3,0 ) and (c 1,γ , c 2,0 , c 3,γ )) is 3γδ. Now let us move to the proof of our general result. 
We show that the above π N,a 's, w N,i 's, p N,i 's and δ indeed constitute a solution to F (V N,a (c 1,s1 , . . . , c n,sn ) = ∑ a∈M,ai=bi (π N,a (0)+∑ ℓ∈N (q N,a,ℓ ⋅δ⋅s ℓ )). The first equality follows from (4.2) and (4.3) and the second equality follows from (P.π 1 ) and (P.π 4 ). Now, if (1) 
The first equality holds by (P.q 1 ) and the second equality holds by (P.π 3 ). Otherwise, letv
The first equality holds by (P.π 4 ) and the second equality holds by (P.q 4 ). Now, ifv i ≤v
. Thus, by (1) and (2), we have (F.mon).
(F.cs) is induced by the same set of constraints as (F.mon); that is, by (P.π 1 ), (P.π 3 ), (P.π 4 ), (P.q 1 )-(P.q 4 ), (4.2) and (4.3). Following the same argument as above, if
Thus we get (F.cs).
(F.sp) is induced by (F.step) and (4.4) . This is because by (F.step), the integral part of (F.sp) is over a discrete domain and thus we can write (F.sp) as (4.4).
(F.rm) is induced by (4.4) and the rest of the constraints in F . As stated above, if bidder i belongs to all a ∈ M N , then ∀v , w N,i (v ) = 1 and thus
is clear that dropping bidder j ≠ i either does not change the payment of bidder i or sets it to zero (if dropping j entails a case in which i belongs to all the allocation in the support of the mechanism). Thus (F.rm) follows immediately. ◻
Constraints in P (V (b)
N,G , G) are all linear or quadratic, and so our problem of identifying mechanism M γ can be reduced to solving a set of quadratically constrained linear programs where the objective function in each is to maximize δ, and then checking each for δ > 0. However, we can do even better. The next result demonstrates that this QCLP is always feasible; later, we will show how to analytically construct a solution with δ > 0.
Thus we have (P.π 1 ). We can write (P.π 2 ) and (P.π 4 ) as (4.5)
Let t a denote ∑ i∈N (q N,a,i ⋅ s i ). If t a = 0 then let π N,a = π N,a (0); by the assumption of the lemma, (4.5) holds. Otherwise, we can rewrite each equation (4.5) in which t a < 0 as δ ≤ −π N,a (0) ta , and t a > 0 as δ ≤
. Now, we have many constraints of the form δ ≤ k for different nonnegative k's. Denote the smallest k by k * and set δ = k * . Thus (4.5) holds and furthermore, since all π N,a (0)'s and all k's are greater than zero, k * = δ is greater than zero. Note that if t a = 0 in all constraints (4.5), any δ > 0 would work.
It remains to show that (P.π 3 ) holds. We can
The first equality holds by (P.π 4 ), the third equality holds by the lemma's assumption. and the fifth equality holds by (P.q 1 ), (P.q 4 ) and (P.q 5 ). ◻ THEOREM 4.1. For any given γ ≥ 0, there exists a γ-step randomized mechanism that is strategyproof and revenue monotonic and satisfies participation, maximality and (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty, for some δ > 0.
Proof. It is easy to verify that regardless of V . Since we have complete freedom in choosing π N,a (0)'s, we can set them appropriately-that is to set π N,a1,3 (0) = 1 3 and π N,a2 (0) = 2 3-so that δ = 1 3γ is feasible. As we said earlier, we described the solution of S 3,2 for N = N and G = G. To fully define the mechanism we simply have to find δ for all choices for N and G and keep the smallest δ-which indeed is δ = 1 3γ . Our QCLP formulation characterizes a class of randomized mechanisms that satisfy our desired properties. However, a mechanism designer may also hope to optimize some additional objective function such as social welfare or revenue. In our construction above, we have full or partial freedom to set δ, M N , π N,a , and q N,a,i . Here, we briefly discuss tuning δ; we leave further investigations of optimization for future work.
Fixing M N 's, π N,a 's and q N,a,i 's, we obtain a strategyproof mechanism, which yields the same social welfare no matter how we set δ. This is because the social welfare depends only on the allocation and bidders' true valuations. Since fixed sets of M N 's and π N,a 's always produce the same distribution over the allocation space, the social welfare is always the same in expectation regardless of δ. On the other hand, δ does affect payments; indeed, the maximum δ maximizes revenue. Furthermore, the bigger δ is, the stronger is the consumer sovereignty guarantee offered to bidders. Thus maximizing δ offers (different) benefits both to the auctioneer and to bidders.
A Polynomial Time Algorithm
At first glance, it may seem that constructing M γ requires time exponential in the number of potential bidders N and goods G, since P has an exponential number of variables and constraints. As the example S 3,2 in Section 4 shows, some settings are "easy to solve" because of their special bidderbundle structure that let us circumvent the exponential nature of the problem. It turns out that, even in the general case, we can always construct M N for all V Steps 1-3 take O( N G log( G )) time and we have to run them at most N times, since in each run at least one bidder is marked as "awarded". Thus, the algorithm take time O( N 2 G log( G )) to run. We add one allocation to M N at the end of each run; thus M N is of size O( N ). ◻ Unfortunately, finding a desirable solution among the set of feasible solutions-e.g. a solution that maximizes δ-can be complicated and dependent on the architecture of the given bidder-bundle setting, our choice of M N 's and the other parameters. However, we can construct a feasible solution in polynomial time giving a (loose) lower bound on the maximum δ that satisfies our constraints. N,G , G and N , we can construct a γ-step randomized mechanism M γ in time polynomial in N and G such that M γ is strategyproof and revenue monotonic and satisfies participation, maximality and (γ-step, δ) consumer sovereignty where δ =
